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Einschätzung der Bedrohung durch Einzeltäter-Terrorismus: Reliabilität und Validität des TRAP-18
Zusammenfassung
Terrorismus, insbesondere durch sog. Einzeltäter, gilt sowohl in Nordamerika als auch in Europa als wesentliche Bedro-
hung der nationalen Sicherheit. Die Bedrohung durch Terrorismus hat viele Gesichter, und Gewalt kann aus allen extremen
Ideologien entstehen. Die Autoren stellen in diesem Beitrag den theoretischen Hintergrund und die aktuellen empirischen
Erkenntnisse zum Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18) vor. Der TRAP-18 folgt dem Ansatz der struk-
turierten, professionellen Risikobeurteilung und ist zur Einschätzung von Personen geeignet, die für mögliche terroristische
Gewaltakte infrage kommen. Dabei kann das Instrument unabhängig von einer bestimmten Ideologie angewendet werden.
Der TRAP-18 besteht aus 8 proximalen und 10 distalen Faktoren. Er wurde entwickelt, um den Anwender in konkreten
Fällen bei der Priorisierung eines sich abzeichnenden Risikos zu unterstützen und dadurch die Intensität des Monitorings
und aktiven Managements in einem Fall festzulegen. Forschungsergebnisse weisen auf eine exzellente Interrater-Reliabi-
lität sowie auf vielversprechende Inhalts-, Kriteriums- und Diskriminanzvalidität sowie prädiktive Validität hin. Weitere
Studien sind aktuell in Arbeit. Derzeit nutzen Terrorismusexperten in Nordamerika und Europa den TRAP-18. Er kann als
hilfreiche Herangehensweise dienen für Fachpersonen, die Personen bezüglich der Gefährdung der nationalen Sicherheit
einschätzen bzw. behandeln müssen.
Schlüsselwörter Strukturierte professionelle Risikobeurteilung · Warnverhalten · Terrorismus · Einzeltäter ·
Identifizierung · Bedrohungsmanagement
Introduction
And I call for my Muslim brothers and sisters all over
the world to take part in jihad, and to fight for the
dominance of this religion, as much as each of you
can. If you can’t join your brothers on the front lines,
then fight for Islam in your countries. And if you live in
Europe, then fight against those pigs, each to his own
abilities. May Allah grant us success in [this fight].
I pledge myself to Allah and vow to shed as much
blood as it needs for Islam to prevail. I pray for Al-
lah to pave the way for me to kill those infidels who
fight Islam and Muslims (Translation from YouTube
video in Arab language, since removed).
A.A., then 24 years old from Tunisia, filmed himself and
pledged this vow a few weeks before he committed an act
of terror while driving a truck into a Christmas market near
Berlin Memorial Church on December 19, 2016. Twelve
people died and more than 50 were severely injured. Böck-
ler et al. (2017) analyzed this complex case through the
lens of the warning behaviors which are indicators of ac-
celerating risk for targeted violence (Meloy et al. 2012).
These warning behaviors are part of the Terrorist Radical-
ization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), a structured pro-
fessional judgment instrument (SPJ) that will be introduced
in this contribution as a way to help professionals prior-
itize cases of targeted terrorist violence concerning their
imminency of risk—regardless of the terrorists’ particular
ideology (Meloy 2017).
Challenges of terrorism
Risk assessment and prevention of terrorist attacks are
daunting and challenging tasks. The challenge starts with
the insight that a legally or scientifically accepted defini-
tion of terrorism that serves as a gold standard is missing
(Leygraf 2014). But ideologies which drive such acts of
violence toward noncombatant civilians share two common
characteristics (Meloy 2017). First, they are acts of targeted
violence, that is, intended and purposeful events which are
virtually always the culmination of a pathway toward vi-
olence. These actions are not impulsive and typically not
a reaction to an imminent threat, which define most vio-
lence among individuals (Meloy 2006). Second, as Nedopil
(2014) has noted, not only is a target selected but also an
audience. The terrorist hopes that society will respond with
insecurity, fear and a growing mistrust toward each other.
Bakunin, the 19th century anarchist, called it “propaganda
of the deed” (Meloy 2017).
Terrorism, especially lone-actor terrorism, is considered
a major national security threat in both North America
and Europe, while acts of terrorism are most frequent in
the Middle East (Institute for Economics and Peace 2019).
Lone actors do not operate as steady members of a large
terrorist cell or organization. Nonetheless, lone actors are
inspired and radicalized by writings and postings of like-
minded individuals and charismatic leaders through virtual
and face-to face contact. The exact line between “lone ac-
tors” and operating (small) cells are blurred in some cases.
A.A. seemed to have had ties and support from IS (Bun-
desministerium für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz 2017). In
contrast the 21-year-old attacker from Kosovo who killed
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two US soldiers at Frankfurt airport seemed to have radical-
ized himself to a great extent through the Internet (Böckler
et al. 2016). Until recently the media and law enforcement
agencies have focused on violent Islamic jihadists (e.g., the
attack on the journalists for Charlie Hebdo in France in
2015), but serious threats from right-wing ideologies and
specific groups (Reichsbürger, etc.) are not to be underes-
timated—and are growing— (Bundesministerium des In-
nern, für Bau und Heimat 2019), since threats and violence
can arise from all extremes (e.g., attack on a mosque in
Christchurch, New Zealand, 2019). The violent method of-
ten overshadows and becomes the ideology.
Leygraf (2014) forensic psychiatrically evaluated one
end of the extreme. He gave expert reports to the courts
concerning 29 Islamistic terrorists between 2000 and 2013.
In the “immigrant” group (n= 19), no psychopathological
traits were detected. The author described them as primar-
ily dissocial offenders, as well as offenders who had failed
to cope with their way of life or their personal aims in
life. The other ten offenders grew up in Germany. Three
subjects suffered from a schizophrenic psychosis and two
had a primarily dissocial personality. The remaining sub-
jects showed some special features in their developmen-
tal background (identity crises), but without any noticeable
uniform background pattern that pointed toward Islamic ter-
rorism. No single distinctive profile of “the Islamistic ter-
rorist” emerged.
But do lone actors with varying ideologies differ signifi-
cantly on personal, psychopathological and social indicators
or violence risk factors? Bouhana et al. (2018) compared
right-wing lone actors with other lone actors (e.g., jihadist).
They found some differences: Right-wing lone actors com-
mitted significantly more violent offenses in the past and
used firearms more often than bladed instruments during the
attack. But the authors concluded that right-wing lone ac-
tors and the individuals adhering to other ideologies showed
far more similarities than differences on the majority of
indicators, including all indicators related to motivation,
capability, as well as pre-attack warning signs. Bouhana
et al. (2018) addressed the extent to which risk assessment
tools and processes should be tailored to a specific ideol-
ogy. They concluded that some specificity and variability
in indicators are likely and possible due to social and self-
selection effects, but that it can be assumed that underlying
processes and mechanisms are similar among all lone-actor
terrorists (Gill 2015). More research is needed, of course,
but the state of the science suggests that terrorists from
a particular ideology do not show a singular profile as a re-
sult of their group affiliation, nor can they be effortlessly
distinguished from individuals with other ideological back-
grounds in terms of psychopathology, personality or other
specific risk factors.
Complicating the challenging matter are the very low
base rates for such terrorist acts, which preclude accurate
prediction. According to Borum (2015) there are four key
guidelines when developing a terrorism-related threat as-
sessment scheme: (a) broadly conceiving risk factors from
both an idiographic and nomothetic perspective; (b) being
open to different pathways and different roles in terrorism
(e.g., leader or supporter) for a person of concern (POC);
(c) recognizing that large group factors (such as age) may or
may not apply to the POC and (d) emphasizing prevention/
management of risk rather than prediction.
It is also very important that we distinguish between
prediction and prevention, whether in threat assessment
or public health in general. The current pandemic of the
corona virus, for example, is being managed through the
treatment of symptomatic individuals, but also the identi-
fication of risk factors and their management in the most
vulnerable individuals in society—without trying to predict
which of those most vulnerable individuals will become
symptomatic. Prevention is attainable if the focus is upon
fact-based behaviors of concern, and threat management is
employed to mitigate such behaviors (Meloy et al. 2014).
Threat assessment and violence risk assessment are similar
but do also emphasize different aspects. Threat assessment
and management focuses upon the identification, assess-
ment, and management of a POC in real time—with close
attention paid to the target and the situation— while the
traditional task of “violence risk assessment” is the deter-
mination of relative risk in an individual at a particular
point in time by determining the base rate of violence for
the group within which he or she belongs. The latter tends
to be a more static task, while the former is often more
dynamic and urgent.
TRAP-18: warning behaviors and distal
characteristics
Proximal behaviors of concern were included in the warn-
ing behaviors, first introduced through a sample of German
public figure attackers (Hoffmann et al. 2011). The concept
of “warning behaviors” originated in the studies of the Fix-
ated Research Group concerning abnormal communications
and approaches to the British Royal Family (James et al.
2007) and were termed by other authors as “pre-attack sig-
nals” (Dietz and Martell 1989). Since a structured approach
and typology of such warning behaviors was missing in the
threat assessment literature, they were organized and oper-
ationalized after intensive research on targeted or intended
violence, discussions with colleagues, and the casework ex-
perience of the original authors. The 8 warning behaviors
capture behavioral or psychological patterns which consti-
tute change and may evidence accelerating risk (Meloy et al.
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Fig. 1 Suggested relationship between TRAP-18 indicators and attack
2012). They contain dynamic rather than static factors, since
the former typically offer more substantial contributions
to the assessment and management of short-term violence
which is usually the focus of threat assessment (Douglas
and Skeem 2005). The warning behaviors are not discrete
variables, but patterns for analysis (Guldimann et al. 2013).
They have been researched in various samples of intended
violence such as school shooters vs. school threateners, in-
timate partner homicide (Meloy et al. 2014), mass murders
in Germany (Allwinn et al. 2019) and Switzerland (Ilic and
Frei 2019), and some of the warning behaviors have been
included in the PRAT, a tool developed by the Swedish
Defence Research Agency to discover linguistic markers in
the written (online) communication of lone actors (Akrami
et al. 2018).
Against this empirical background the 8 warning be-
haviors were included as proximal indicators of violence
risk in the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol
(TRAP-18). Second, 10 distal characteristics of the lone-ac-
tor terrorist were derived from studying the extant empirical
and theoretical research on terrorism, and Meloy’s experi-
ence in directly and indirectly assessing both foreign and
Table 1 TRAP-18: 8 proximal
and 10 distal indicators
Proximal Warning Behaviors Distal Characteristics
Pathway Personal Grievance and Moral Outrage
Fixation Framed by an Ideology
Identification Failure to Affiliate with an Extremist or Other Group
Novel Aggression Dependence on the Virtual Community
Energy Burst Thwarting of Occupational Goals
Leakage Changes in Thinking and Emotion
Last Resort Failure of Sexually Intimate Pair Bonding
Directly Communicated Threat Mental Disorder
– Creativity and Innovation
– Criminal Violence
domestic lone-actor terrorists (Meloy and Yakeley 2014,
Fig. 1). Guiding the development of the TRAP-18 were
also Monahan’s (2012) recommendations that domains of
(a) grievances, (b) ideologies, (c) affiliations and (d) moral
emotions should be included in risk assessment instruments
for terrorist violence.
The 18 indicators are coded as either present or absent if
there is sufficient evidence to make this determination. The
TRAP-18 is not a psychological test, nor an actuarial risk
assessment instrument. There are no empirically derived
cutoffs for the TRAP-18 since it is a structured professional
judgment instrument. Nevertheless, the model advances the
hypothesis that one proximal warning behavior is neces-
sary for active threat management, while the presence of
only distal characteristics means the case should be moni-
tored. The following TRAP-18 definitions are abbreviated
and should not be used as the basis for threat assessment
without training in the use of structured professional in-
struments and the TRAP-18 (Meloy 2017; gifrinc.com, Ta-
ble 1).
The 8 proximal warning behaviors
1. Pathway warning behavior is research, planning, prepara-
tion, or implementation of an attack (Fein and Vossekuil
1999; Calhoun and Weston 2003).
2. Fixation warning behavior indicates an increasingly
pathological preoccupation with a person or a cause,
accompanied by a deterioration in social and occupa-
tional functioning (Mullen et al. 2009).
3. Identification warning behavior indicates a psychologi-
cal desire to be a pseudocommando (Dietz 1986; Knoll
2010), have a warrior mentality (Hempel et al. 1999),
closely associate with weapons or other military or law
enforcement paraphernalia, identify with previous attack-
ers or assassins, or identify oneself as an agent to advance
a particular cause or belief system (Meloy et al. 2012).
4. Novel Aggression warning behavior is an act of violence
that appears unrelated to any targeted violence pathway
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and is committed for the first time. It is often a test of
one’s capability to carry out an act of violence (Meloy
et al. 2012).
5. Energy Burst warning behavior is an increase in the fre-
quency or variety of any noted activities related to the
target, even if the activities themselves are relatively in-
nocuous, usually in the hours, days or weeks before the
attack (Odgers et al. 2009; Meloy et al. 2012).
6. Leakage warning behavior is the communication to
a third party of an intent to do harm to a target through
an attack (Meloy and O’Toole 2011).
7. Last Resort warning behavior is evidence of a “violent
action imperative” and “time imperative” (Mohandie and
Duffy 1999); it is often a signal of desperation or distress.
8. Directly Communicated Threat warning behavior is the
communication of a direct threat to the target or law en-
forcement beforehand (Meloy et al. 2012).
The 10 distal characteristics of the TRAP-18
1. Personal Grievance and Moral Outrage joins both per-
sonal life experience and particular historical, religious,
or political events. The personal grievance is often de-
fined by a major loss in love or work, feelings of anger
and humiliation, and the blaming of others. Moral out-
rage is typically a vicarious identification with a group
that has suffered, even though the POC has usually not
experienced the same suffering, if any at all.
2. Framed by an Ideology is the presence of a belief sys-
tem that justifies the POC’s intent to act. It can be a re-
ligious belief system, a political philosophy, a secular
commitment, a one-issue conflict, or an idiosyncratic
justification (Simon 2013; Meloy and Yakeley 2014).
3. Failure to Affiliate with an Extremist or Other Group
is defined by the actual failure or rejection of the POC
from a group that he wants to join.
4. Dependence on the Virtual Community is evidence of
the POC’s active communication with others through
social media, chat rooms, e-mails, listservs, texting,
tweeting, and so forth about his radical or extreme
beliefs.
5. Thwarting of Occupational Goals is a major setback or
failure in a planned occupational life course.
6. Changes in Thinking and Emotion is indicated when
thoughts and their expression become more strident,
simplistic, and absolute. Argument ceases, and preach-
ing begins. Persuasion yields to imposition of one’s
beliefs on others. There is no critical analysis of theory
or opinion, and the mantra, “Do not think, just believe”
is adopted. Emotions typically move from anger and
argument, to contempt and disdain for others’ beliefs,
to disgust for the outgroup and a willingness to homici-
dally aggress against them. Violence is cloaked in self-
righteousness and the pretense of superior belief. Hu-
mor is lost.
7. Failure of Sexually Intimate Pair Bonding is coded if the
POC has historically failed to form a lasting sexually
intimate relationship.
8. Mental Disorder is coded if there was evidence of a ma-
jor mental disorder by history or at present.
9. Greater Creativity and Innovation is coded if there is
evidence of tactical thinking “outside the box;” The act
being planned has not been done before in contempora-
neous times, or is likely to be imitated by future offend-
ers (Simon 2013; Meloy and Yakeley 2014).
10. Criminal Violence is coded if there was evidence of in-
strumental criminal violence by history prior to the act
of terrorism (e.g., history of armed robberies or planned
assaults).
Current state of the science on the TRAP-18
The TRAP-18 needs to stand the test of empirical valida-
tion. The empirical findings seem encouraging, but more
extensive and independent research is needed since there
is a clear authorship bias when the developers do research
with their own instrument (Singh et al. 2013).
Meloy et al. (2015a) analyzed 19 cases and 22 individ-
uals who carried out acts of terrorism in Europe between
1980 and 2015. Seven of them formed autonomous cells
(two or more offenders whose actions were not commanded
nor controlled by a terrorist organization, e.g., German Na-
tional Socialist Underground). Only two of the attacks were
not lethal. The mean interrater reliability (Cohen’s kappa)
was 0.895 and ranged from 0.69–1.0 for the warning be-
haviors and 0.75–1.0 for the distal characteristics (good to
excellent across all variables). This study lacked a non-ter-
rorist control group. The results can only be interpreted as
a measure of the goodness of fit with real world terrorists.
As a form of content validity it can be reported that the
majority of lone actors were positive on 13 of 18 TRAP-
18 variables (72%); Individuals acting in autonomous cells
were likewise positive for 13 of 18 variables (72%) of the
TRAP-18. Both groups showed a frequency of >70% on
the distal factors of personal grievance and moral outrage,
framed by an ideology, thwarting of occupational goals, and
changes in thinking and emotion. There was no significant
difference between any of the TRAP-18 indicators when
the terrorists who acted alone (n= 15) were compared with
those in autonomous cells (n= 7), except for the signifi-
cant finding that the latter had a more frequent history of
criminal violence (100%).
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Meloy and Gill (2016) used an open source sample of
111 lone-actor terrorists (1990–2014) from the U.S. and
Europe to further validate the TRAP-18. Terrorism was de-
fined as “the use or threat of action where the use or threat
is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the
public or a section of the public, and/or the use or threat is
made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or
ideological cause” (Gill et al. 2013, p. 2). Seventy per cent
of the terrorists were positive for at least half or more of the
TRAP-18 indicators. Seventy-seven per cent or more evi-
denced four proximal warning behaviors: pathway, fixation,
identification, and leakage, consistent with other domains
for targeted violence (Meloy et al. 2014).
When the sample was divided into Islamic terrorists
(n= 38), extreme right-wing terrorists (n= 43), and single-
issue terrorists, mostly anti-abortionists (n= 30), there were
no significant differences across the 18 indicators except for
four: Islamic extremist lone actors were significantly more
likely to display dependence on the virtual community than
the single-issue terrorists. Extreme right-wing lone actors
were significantly less likely to display personal grievance
and moral outrage, thwarting of occupational goals, and fix-
ation warning behaviors than either the Islamic extremists
or the single-issue terrorists. Single-issue lone actors were
significantly less likely to display dependence on virtual
communities than the Islamic extremists. More research is
warranted, but the results are in line with Bouhana et al.
(2018) findings that a clear profile dependent upon ideol-
ogy is not to be expected.
Finally, successfully executed (n= 67) and planned but
thwarted (n= 44) attacks were compared. A thwarted at-
tack covered plots that were developed by lone-actor ter-
rorists that were interrupted, uncovered, or stopped by law
enforcement and subsequently led to a conviction. The suc-
cessful attackers differed on five TRAP-18 indicators from
the thwarted group. They were significantly more fixated,
creative and innovative, and failed to have a sexually inti-
mate pair bond; and were significantly less likely to have
displayed pathway warning behavior that was discovered
beforehand and be dependent on a virtual community of
likeminded individuals. Effect sizes were small to medium
(Φ= 0.19–0.32). Detectable pathway behavior was evident
in 72% of the successful and in 93% of the thwarted group.
Whether this last difference was based on luck, stealth, or
inadequate intelligence gathering is not clear. The signifi-
cantly more prevalent fixation warning behavior in the suc-
cessful attackers describes an intensity of pursuit and pre-
occupation with the subject, often accompanied by social
deterioration in love and work and the tendency to socially
withdraw. A history of failed sexual pair bonding in gen-
eral—like in the group of successful attackers—also low-
ers the risk of an intimate becoming familiar with one’s
activities and disrupting the operation. On the other hand,
a failure to establish long lasting relationships could inten-
sify fixation on a subject or a person as a substitute for
real relationships. Less dependence on the virtual commu-
nity means a lessened chance of having one’s postings or
social media communication picked up by a third party
or discovered by authorities. Creativity and innovation, an-
other distal characteristic more frequent among the success-
ful attackers, contributes to the success of the attack. From
an operational point of view, these findings make sense but
need to be replicated in further studies.
In an independent study by Challacombe and Lucas
(2018), 58 US domestic terrorists (Sovereign Citizens:
typically extreme right wing anti-government)—30 who
had committed violent or dangerous actions and 28 who
committed nonviolent criminal actions in a 10-year frame
(2004–2014)—were compared. Interrater reliability was
excellent (kappa= 0.76). These TRAP-18 indicators signif-
icantly correlated with violence with medium to large effect
sizes (Φ= 0.33–0.70): the proximal warning behaviors of
pathway, identification, leakage, and last resort. The distal
characteristics of personal grievance and moral outrage,
framed by ideology, thwarting of occupational goals, and
criminal violence were all more frequent among the violent
right-wing extremists. A binary logistic regression using
the summed TRAP-18 score was performed and correctly
explained 44–59% of the variance. The TRAP-18 total
coding correctly classified 75.9% of the cases as either
violent or nonviolent (odds ratio was 2.10; p= 0.000).
Another comparative study of North American terrorist
attackers (n= 33) and persons of national security con-
cern who were successfully risk managed (n= 23) found
significant differences with medium to large effect sizes
(Φ= 0.35–0.70) across half of the TRAP-18 indicators
(Meloy et al. 2019). The subjects in the study were an
ideological mix of violent jihadists, extreme right-wing
nationalists, and single-issue terrorists. The proximal warn-
ing behaviors which differentiated the attackers from those
subjects of concern were pathway, identification, energy
burst, last resort, and the absence of a directly communi-
cated threat. The distal characteristics which were more
frequent in the attackers were ideological framing, changes
in thinking and emotion, and creativity and innovation.
A follow-up study using the Meloy et al. (2019) sam-
ple and multidimensional scaling analysis—rarely done in
terrorism research—demonstrated that the proximal warn-
ing behaviors clustered together among the attackers, did
not cluster among the non-attackers, and showed less of
a clustering and association of distal characteristics. Distal
characteristics between attackers and non-attackers were
not significantly different. These findings further support
the theory of the TRAP-18 by visually showing the co-
occurrence of the proximal warning behaviors in the at-
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tackers, but not in the non-attackers despite concern for
their behaviors (Goodwill and Meloy 2019).
What has emerged across all the targeted violence re-
search to date is the ubiquity of the proximal warning be-
haviors of pathway, fixation, identification, leakage, energy
burst, and last resort. Within the lone-actor terrorist do-
main, the evolution from fixation to identification—what
one thinks about all the time (preoccupation), to what one
becomes (self identity)—may be a critical marker for mobi-
lization for violence (Challacombe and Lucas 2018; Meloy
et al. 2019). This transition should be closely monitored
by the threat manager in face-to face discussions, written
statements in the real or virtual world, or other symbolic
actions initiated by the POC.
A directly communicated threat did not emerge in the
existing studies as a critical warning behavior in lone-actor
terrorists. This finding is in line with other targeted vio-
lence research (except for intimate partner homicide) such
as attacks on public figures or school shootings and makes
sense from an operational perspective (Meloy et al. 2014).
During the writing of this paper the attack in Hanau, Ger-
many, occurred. The attacker killed 9 people with immi-
gration backgrounds, and finally his mother and himself.
The investigation is still ongoing and final conclusions are
not warranted, but at the point of this writing there is no
evidence of a directly communicated threat beforehand. To
be clear, a directly communicated threat should always be
seriously assessed; but the lack of such a threat in any case
should not be mistaken as an “all clear sign.”
Monahan and Steadman (1996) first introduced a weather
analogy to violence risk assessment which appears in the
context of the TRAP-18 to be a useful metaphor: The
presence of a cluster of TRAP-18 distal characteristics,
along with the absence of all proximal warning behaviors,
indicate there may be storm clouds on the horizon. It is still
uncertain if a storm will form, but a “Watch” needs to be
initiated. In the world of threat assessment, this means that
the case should be monitored and reviewed on a regular
basis. Monitoring should be done contemporaneously in
both virtual and terrestrial worlds. The case does not yet
warrant more commitment of active management resources.
The presence of any one proximal warning behavior, on
the other hand, means the storm may be in one’s backyard.
A “Warning” needs to be initiated. In the world of threat
assessment, this means active management: face-to-face
interview with the POC and/or collateral interviews with
family or peers; review of records (e.g., military, crimi-
nal, residence, police incidents, employment); social media
monitoring; civil commitment, release, and discharge plan-
ning; safety plan development for school, work, home and
the community at large; and obtaining signed consents to
communicate with the POC’s mental health professional to
monitor progress (Goodwill and Meloy 2019).
As practitioners, we are the first to acknowledge that
any given case is far more complex than empirical results
or analogies might suggest. For example, the clustering
of three “strong” distal characteristics with the proximal
warning behaviors in the Goodwill and Meloy (2019) most
recent study—namely, personal grievance and moral out-
rage, ideological framing, and changes in thinking and emo-
tion—complicate the weather analogy. A storm is forming,
but its arrival may not be imminent. However, active man-
agement of the case is likely to be warranted if these three
strong distal characteristics are present—even in the ab-
sence of known proximal warning behaviors.
Conclusions and further directions
The TRAP-18 has been subjected to peer-reviewed studies
testing its reliability and validity, including research inde-
pendent of its developer (Challacombe and Lucas 2018;
Garcia-Andrade et al. 2019). The retrospective nature of
the studies and the small sample sizes have to be taken into
account when interpreting the results. Further research is
warranted and potential weaknesses of the TRAP-18 (e.g.,
lack of protective factors) need to be taken into account,
but the results so far seem promising. There are other in-
struments used to assess risk of terrorist violence, including
the ERG 22+ (Extremism Risk Guidelines; Lloyd and Dean
2015) and the VERA (Violent Extremism Risk Assessment;
Pressman 2009). Multimethod approaches are best for the
assessment of terrorism risk, and other instruments that cor-
relate with violence risk, such as the HCR-20 V3 (His-
torical-Clinical-Risk; Douglas et al. 2013) and the PCL-R
(Hare 2003) are also recommended.
The application of instruments is only the first step.
Threat management can only succeed if an interdisciplinary
approach is guaranteed. Police, law enforcement, forensic
and general mental health professionals and other experts
must join forces. We have not elaborated on the issue of the
prevalence of mental disorders in terrorists, but while some
violence may stem from long held racist attitudes—such
as is evident in the globalization of the white supremacist
movement— other violence is the result of a combination
of mental illness and radicalization in the attacker. The po-
tential for human loss is the same, but management strate-
gies to prevent such attacks are quite different (e.g., ensur-
ing medical–psychiatric treatment vs. no such treatment).
The case must be analyzed on an individual level since
a “one size fits them all” strategy is likely doomed to fail
(Habermeyer and Guldimann 2019). The paradox is that
the professional involved will usually never know whether
the (terrorist) act would have occurred if he or she had not
intervened. Nevertheless, the operational necessity to focus
upon fact-based behaviors in the present, rather than static
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diagnoses or historical factors in the investigation of POCs,
is the key to successful prevention (Meloy et al. 2015b).
Further research should also focus on disengagement
factors in terrorists, and the potential of linguistic analy-
sis should be given more weight, since the “terrorist in the
making” is drawn to the cyberprints of like-minded spir-
its and leaves his own imprint in the digital world. Ac-
cording to Gill (2015), reinforcement of beliefs, seeking
legitimization for their actions, disseminating propaganda,
recruitment, attack preparations, overcoming obstacles and
signaling the attack are motives to get and stay connected
in virtual reality.
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